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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
[flt may be admitted that many of the justifications for
strict liability have force regarding professional medical serv-
ices. The provider of medical services appears to stand in
substantially the same position with respect to the patient as
the seller of goods does with the consumer. The typical pur-
chaser of medicl [sic] services cannot evaluate the quality
of care offered because medical services are complex and in-
frequently bought. The medical care market gives the pur-
chaser little assistance in enabling the purchaser to evaluate
what he or she is buying. It is generally the physician - not
the patient - who determines the kind of services to be ren-
dered and how often. It is the physician not the patient who
prescribes other goods and services, e.g., drugs, therapy, and
hospitalization, that should supplement the physician's serv-
ices. The physician is in a better position than the patient to
determine and improve the quality of the services, and the
patient's reliance on the doctor's skill, care and reputation is
perhaps greater than the reliance of the consumer of goods.
The difficulties faced by plaintiffs in carrying the burden of
proving negligence on the part of a doctor are well known
... . The hospital and doctor are in a better position than
the patient to bear and distribute the risk of loss. 8
Nevertheless, the effect of such a theory on medical mal-
practice insurance, the inherent differences between medical
services and products, the need for readily available medical
services, and the likelihood of increased medical costs from
adopting such a theory presented strong enough public policy
arguments to prevent the court from permitting such an exten-
sion of strict liability, at least at this time.
Ross A. ANDERSON
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
I. INHERITANCE TAX RATES: SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
In re Estate of Walker' dealt with the right of certain distri-
butees to exempt from state inheritance tax a portion of the
property received.' The amounts exempted in Wisconsin Stat-
68. 79 Wis. 2d at 468-69, 256 N.W.2d at 391 (footnotes omitted).
1. 75 Wis. 2d 93, 248 N.W.2d 410 (1977).
2. There are four classifications of distributees: Class A: surviving spouse, lineal
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utes section 72.171 must be applied with the rates in Wisconsin
Statutes section 72.181 to arrive at the net tax liability.
The court in Walker resolved the conflicting applications of
these statutes as urged by the Department of Revenue and the
surviving spouse.' This particular problem of interpretation did
not arise until 1971 when the language of section 72.18 was
adopted.' Finding that sections 72.17 and 72.18 were ambigu-
ous when read together,7 the court ruled that the revenue de-
partment's computation was the result intended by the legisla-
ture.8
The court relied primarily on legislative history to support
its conclusion, and that reliance was well-placed. In December
1970 the Advisory Committee on Inheritance and Gift Tax con-
heirs; Class B: brother, sister, and descendants thereof; Class C: aunt, uncle, and
descendants thereof; Class D: all others, whether related or not. Wis. STAT. § 72.16
(1973).
3. This section reads in part, "Exemptions from the tax, to be applied against the
first $25,000 and then, where an additional amount is permitted, against the next
$25,000, are allowed as follows:
(1) To a surviving spouse, property of a clear market value of $50,000. . . ... WIs.
STAT. § 72.17 (1971).
4. This section reads in part,
When property is transferred by reason of a death to or for the use of a distribu-
tee and when its clear market value exceeds the exemption in s. 72.17, a tax,
subject to the limitation under s. 72.19, is imposed at the following rates:
(1) Class A distributees are taxed upon the balance, if any, of the first
$25,000 over the exemption at 2.5%; upon nonexempt property which exceeds
$25,000 and does not exceed $50,000, at 5%; upon property which exceeds
$50,000 and does not exceed $100,000, at 7.5%; upon property which exceeds
$100,000 and does not exceed $500,000, at 10%; and upon property which ex-
ceeds $500,000, at 12.5%.
Wis. STAT. § 72.18 (1971) (amended 1973 Wis. Laws, ch. 90 § 362).
5. For example, assume an estate of $100,000 with an allowable $50,000 deduction
for the surviving spouse as provided in § 72.17:
Computation by department of revenue:
$25,000 exempt from 2.5% rate.
$25,000 exempt from 5% rate.
$50,000 taxed at 7.5% rate.
Total tax $3,750.
Computation by taxpayer:
$50,000 exemption to surviving spouse.
$25,000 taxed at 2.5% rate.
$25,000 taxed at 5% rate.
Total tax $1,875.
6. 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 310. The court asserted in Walker that prior to the adoption
of § 72.18, the statutes provided for determination of the tax as computed by the
department of revenue. 75 Wis. 2d at 103, 248 N.W.2d at 415.
7. 75 Wis. 2d at 102, 248 N.W.2d at 414.
8. Id. at 104, 248 N.W.2d at 415.
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sidered the bill draft of section 72.18. As originally drafted the
section read, "Class A distributees are subject to tax upon the
balance of the first $25,000 over the exemption at the rate of
2.5%."1 Since that language could be interpreted to mean a
Class A distributee would pay at the rate of 2.5 percent on the
first $25,000 above the $50,000 exemption, the committee
changed the language to read, "Class A distributees are taxed
upon the balance, if any, of the first $25,000 over the exemption
at 2.5%."'1 The change reflected the committee's intent that
the recipient pay in the 7.5 percent bracket after the $50,000
exemption. Thus, it appears that the legislature intended the
method of computation used by the Department of Revenue in
Walker.
The Department's interpretation was further supported by
the 1973 amendment to section 72.18(1) which added this final
sentence: "The personal exemption applies against the lowest
bracket."" The Walker court ' noted that the added language
"comes close to eliminating an ambiguity so that the section
as amended makes clear on its face"'" the method of computa-
tion.
This method of computation also applies to other distribu-
tees eligible for an exemption. For example, under the current
Wisconsin Statutes, a child receiving $30,000 from a parent is
eligible for the $4,000 exemption provided in section 72.17(1).,3
This $4,000 exemption is applied against the 2.5 percent
bracket. Thus, the child will pay inheritance tax on $21,000 at
the 2.5 percent rate and on the remaining $5,000 at the 5 per-
cent rate. Although Walker created no new law, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's construction of these statutes settled a ques-
tion for which both sides had persuasive arguments.
II. INHERITANCE TAXABILITY: EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
The taxpayer in In re Estate of Puchner" was a widow who
received $72,000 from an employee benefit plan. The plan was
9. Advisory Committee on Inheritance and Gift Tax, Minutes of Dec. 18, 1970, at
22.
10. (Emphasis added). This was the wording of § 72.18 as adopted by the legisla-
ture. See note 6 supra.
11. 1973 Wis. Laws, ch. 90 § 362.
12. 75 Wis. 2d at 105, 248 N.W.2d at 416. The court, thus, read the amendment as
a clarification of the statute.
13. Wis. STAT. § 72.17(1) (1975).
14. 78 Wis. 2d 525, 254 N.W.2d 722 (1977).
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created by a corporate resolution which provided payment to
the widows of certain corporate officials. The employee made
no contribution to the plan, had no right to name the benefici-
ary and had no right to receive benefits during his lifetime.
None of the funds passed through the decedent's estate.' 5 The
court's conclusion that the payments were subject to the Wis-
consin inheritance tax was based on two determinations: (1)
section 72.01(3)(c),'8 and not section 72.01(3)(b),' 7 was the
applicable statute; and (2) the payments were not excluded
from tax under section 2039 of the Internal Revenue Code. 8
The first determination was reached by a reading of the two
Wisconsin Statutes. Section 72.01(3) (b) described transfers
intended to take effect at death. Prior to the enactment of
section 72.01(3)(c), subsection (b) was used to determine the
inheritance taxability of employee benefit plans. 9 Section
72.01(3)(c) was created specifically for employee benefit
plans."0 Thus, Mrs. Puchner's tax liability was decided under
subsection (c).
The court's second determination involved the effect of the
incorporation of section 2039 of the Internal Revenue Code into
section 72.01(3)(c). Subsection (a) of section 2039 is a rule of
15. Id. at 527-28, 254 N.W.2d at 723.
16. This section reads in part, "Benefits paid to a beneficiary under an employee
benefit plan shall be taxable for inheritance tax purposes except to the extent that the
proportionate share resulting from the employer's contribution would be excludible in
the gross estate of the decedent under sec. 2039 of the internal revenue code." Wis.
STAT. § 72.01(3)(c) (1967) (renumbered and amended 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 310; current
version at Wis. STAT. § 72.12(4)(c) (1975)). See note 31 infra.
17. This section reads,
When a transfer is of property, made without an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth by a resident or by a nonresident when such
nonresident's property is within this state, or within its jurisdiction, by deed,
grant, bargain, sale or gift, intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the death of the grantor, vendor or donor, including any transfer
where the transferor has retained for his life or for any period not ending before
his death: 1 the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income, or to
economic benefit from, the property, or 2 the right, either alone or in conjunction
with any person, to alter, amend, revoke or terminate such transfer, or to desig-
nate the beneficiary who shall possess or enjoy the property, or the income, or
economic benefit therefrom.
Wis. STAT. § 72.01(3)(b) (1965) (renumbered and amended 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 310;
current version at Wis. STAT. § 72.12(4)(b) (1975)).
18. I.R.C. § 2039.
19. See Estate of King, 28 Wis. 2d 431, 137 N.W.2d 122 (1965); Estate of Stone, 10
Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663 (1960); Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645
(1955).
20. 78 Wis. 2d at 531, 254 N.W.2d at 725.
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inclusion with respect to certain annuities which a decedent
received or had a right to receive during his lifetime. Subsec-
tion (b) of section 2039 limits the amount of the annuity inclu-
dible in the gross estate to the amount which is proportionate
to the part of the purchase price contributed by the decedent.
Section 2039(c) exempts amounts receivable under certain
plans which might otherwise be includible in the gross estate
under any provision of the Internal Revenue Code. The tax-
payer argued that all of section 2039 must be considered in
determining inheritance taxability of the decedent's employee
benefit plan.21 Therefore, since the payments would not be in-
cludible in the gross estate under sections 2039(a) and (b) in
the first instance, the exclusion requirements of section 2039(c)
were not applicable. On the facts of this case the payments
could not have been reached for federal estate tax purposes
under sections 2039(a) and (b).
In contrast, the Department of Revenue contended that sec-
tion 72.01(3)(c) referred only to section 2039(c). The Depart-
ment argued that the payments to the widow in this case were
not entitled to exemption under subsection (c) and were, there-
fore, taxable under section 72.01(3)(c). 2 2 Agreeing with the
Department of Revenue, the court concluded that the language
in section 72.01(3)(c), "proportionate share resulting from
the employer's contribution, '23 referred only to the qualified
plans described in section 2039(c).
The court found that the plain language of section 72.01(3)
did not exempt both qualified and unqualified plans from the
Wisconsin inheritance tax. Thus, taxability under section
72.01(3) was determined by whether the benefit payments
would be totally excluded from the gross estate for federal es-
tate tax purposes under section 2039 or under any other section
of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the plain language of
section 72.01(3)(c) did not require total exclusion from the
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.25 Deciding the ex-
21. Id. at 535, 254 N.W.2d at 727.
22. Id. at 537, 254 N.W.2d at 728.
23. See note 16 supra.
24. 78 Wis. 2d at 537, 254 N.W.2d at 728. Since a benefit payment excluded from
the gross estate under § 2039(b) might be taxable under other federal estate tax
provisions, to escape Wisconsin inheritance tax, the benefit plan must be one of the
qualified plans referred to in § 2039(c).
25. Section 72.01(3)(c), note 16 supra, referred to an employer's contribution which
"would be excludible...under sec. 2039."
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tent to which section 2039 was incorporated into section
72.01(3)(c) is typical of the problems a court must resolve in
interpreting referential legislation. 8 Despite the court's analy-
sis there remains the question of why the legislature did not
specifically refer to section 2039(c) in the first instance if that
was their intent.
There is another issue, not raised in Puchner, which existed
in applying section 72.01(3)(c): Is the reference to section 2039
an improper delegation of legislative power? When a legislature
adopts a rule in the form in which another lawmaking body has
already passed it, there is clearly no delegation at all." How-
ever, if future laws, rules or regulations are included in the
adoption, there is with equal clarity a delegation. 21 Wisconsin
case law provides that the statute adopted by reference is in-
corporated as of the time of adoption; subsequent changes in
the adopted statute must be expressly included.29 Section
2039(c) of the Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1976
with respect to lump sum distributions."0 The current Wiscon-
sin Statutes refer to section 2039 as amended.31 Yet the lan-
guage of section 72.01(3)(c) still seems to contain a delegation
of legislative power. Inheritance taxability of benefit payments
under Wisconsin law depends on the total exclusion provision
of section 2039(c) however Congress may decide to define that
exclusion. Puchner illustrates the need for the Wisconsin legis-
lature to develop its own specified criteria for inheritance taxa-
tion of employee benefit payments.
26. Referential legislation is a statute which adopts, wholly or in part, provisions
of other statutes. See generally Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While? 25 MINN.
L. REv. 261 (1941).
27. See, e.g., Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922). Accord,
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
28. See, e.g., Clark & Murrell v. Port of Mobile, 67 Ala. 217 (1880), State v.
Holland, 117 Me, 288, 104 A. 159 (1918). See generally 33 MICH. L. REv. 597 (1934-
35).
29. Gilson Bros. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 220 Wis. 347, 265 N.W. 217 (1936).
30. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1520
(amending I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1975)).
31. Benefits paid to a beneficiary under an employee benefit plan are taxa-
ble under this subchapter except to the extent that the proportionate share
resulting from the employer's contribution would be excludable from the gross
estate of the decedent under s. 2039 of the 1954 internal revenue code as
amended. This subsection applies whether or not there is a requirement for filing
a federal estate tax return.
Wis. STAT. § 72.12(4)(c) (1975) (formerly Wis. STAT. § 72.01(3)(c)). See note 16 supra.
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Im. TRUSTEE'S DUTy: DISTRIBUTING TRUST ASSETS
The appellant in In re Trust of Sensenbrenner2 sought a
surcharge against trustees for depreciation in the value of as-
sets between termination of the trust and distribution. The
ground for the surcharge was unreasonable delay in distribut-
ing trust assets. The life-tenant beneficiary of the trust died on
October 8, 1973.31 Trust assets were distributed to the remain-
dermen on April 30, 1974 (stocks) and June 14, 1974 (bonds)."
Between October 1973 and June 1974, several problems arose:
a trustee was appointed to replace the decedent who had been
one of the three original trustees; legal advice was sought con-
cerning a possible tax throwback problem; one of the remaining
original trustees was hospitalized and died in February 1974;
the surviving initial trustee, who was eighty years old, left Mil-
waukee to spend the winter in Florida; remaindermen were
contacted regarding approval of the distribution plan and solic-
itation and receipt of waivers and consents. 3
The court concluded that although any one of the interven-
ing factors might not justify delay in distribution, "[t]here
was a continuous flow of trustee activity." 36 The trial court's
finding that delay was not unreasonable was supported by well-
documented facts and circumstances in the record.
The significance of Sensenbrenner is the court's holding
that the duty of a trustee to distribute trust assets is defined
by the same standards which apply to trust management. The
trustee must use due care and diligence and act as a prudent
and provident person would act under the circumstances. 37 A
sanction arises on failure to use due care and diligence in per-
formance of a duty within a reasonable time: a surcharge is
assessed against the trustee for any loss of trust asset value
caused by the delay.38
Sensenbrenner established several important guidelines for
32. 76 Wis. 2d 625, 252 N.W.2d 47 (1977).
33. Id. at 630, 252 N.W.2d at 49.
34. Id. The market value of the trust fund corpus was only $2.5 million, and the
appellant asserted the value of the trust assets declined by $595,000 during the delay.
35. Id. at 641, 252 N.W.2d at 54.
36. Id.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 345 (1959). Estate of Allis, 191 Wis. 23, 209
N.W. 945, 210 N.W. 418 (1926) (per curiam).
38. 76 Wis. 2d at 636, 252 N.W.2d at 52. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 345, comment f (1959).
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trustees, particularly noncorporate trustees, engaged in trust
asset distribution: (1) All of the circumstances are considered
in examining the length of and justification for any delay, and
accurate records of all relevant circumstances should be kept
by the trustee; (2) the delay is less likely to be found unreason-
able when the trustee engages in a "continuous flow of activ-
ity" directed at solving problems of distribution; and (3) a
trustee is held to the same standard of performance in distrib-
uting assets as the standard imposed for trust management.
The findings in Sensenbrenner have practical as well as prece-
dential value. The possibility that the value of trust assets
could depreciate considerably before actual distribution is a
real one in these times of fluctuating economic conditions.
BARBARA A. KLUKA
I
